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Brexit and UK Environmental Policy
and Politics
Le Brexit et la question environnementale au Royaume-Uni
Charlotte Burns and Neil Carter
 
Introduction
1 On 23 June 2016 the United Kingdom (UK) held a referendum on European Union (EU)1
membership. By a margin of 52% to 48% the British public voted to leave the EU, although
there were some notable geographic patterns to the vote: while 62% of voters in Scotland
and 56% in Northern Ireland supported remain, 52.5% of the electorate in Wales and
53.4% in England voted to leave.  The political  fallout was immediate:  Prime Minister
David Cameron resigned and, following a short leadership contest, Theresa May emerged
unchallenged as the new leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister. The Article
50 process was triggered on 29 March 2017; then, unexpectedly, May called an election,
with the intention of increasing the Conservatives’ majority and thereby strengthening
her hand in the Brexit negotiations. However, after a disastrous election campaign May
actually lost her majority and had to turn to the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist
Party  to  prop  up  her  government  in  parliament  through  a  ‘confidence  and  supply
agreement’. Moreover, she now presided over a divided party and a fractious cabinet.
2 The  environment  did  not  feature  significantly  in  the  debates  leading  up to  the
referendum,  which  focussed  mainly  on  national  sovereignty,  immigration  and  the
economy. Nor was it  prominent in the 2017 election campaign. However,  because UK
environmental  policy  has  been  profoundly  shaped  by  its  EU  membership,  the
environment has emerged as a major issue as the Brexit process has unfolded. A recent
government review of the anticipated impact of Brexit on departmental work found that
the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) will be the second most
Brexit-affected department because 80% of its work is EU related.2 A tranche of studies
have  identified  the  many  challenges  associated  with  repatriating  the  environmental
acquis and  its  associated  governance  infrastructure,  and  they  have  raised  important
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questions about the long term implications of Brexit for the ambition and stability of UK
environment policy.3 There are also wider party political implications – there has been a
move on the right to couple euro-sceptic with anti-environment rhetoric by attacking EU
environmental regulations, which have been characterised as ‘green tape’. This move has
politicised environmental policy in ways that may create instability in a policy sector
where long-term strategic planning and stability are essential for the achievement of key
goals such as decarbonisation. The nature of environmental policy as a devolved policy
sector also raises crucial wider constitutional questions about the relationship between
Westminster  and  the  devolved  nations.  We  conclude  that  even  though  considerable
uncertainty remains about the final outcomes of the Brexit process, on balance it is likely
to have negative implications for UK environmental policy.
 
From Dirty Man of Europe to Limited Leader
3 When the UK joined the EU in 1973 the UK Government  did not  anticipate  that  EU
membership would exert much influence upon domestic environmental policy. British
civil  servants  were  of  the  view  that  the  UK  had  a  long  and  successful  tradition  of
environmental policy dating back to the 1863 Alkali Inspectorate. It was assumed that the
UK had little to learn and little to change as a consequence of joining the EU.4 However, it
rapidly became apparent that the predominant style of UK policy making was different
from that used by other EU states, and that the habits and traditions that characterised
British  policy  were  inconsistent  with  the  emerging  EU  policy  style.  The  UK  had
traditionally  preferred  to  regulate  via  negotiated  consent  with  informal  agreements
between the government and those being regulated. This voluntarist approach was at
odds with the uniform emission standards and regulations backed up in law, preferred by
other EU states.5 
4 The Department for Environment (DoE)6 initially struggled to cope with the demands of
EU membership for it was slow to realise that being obstructive in negotiations did not
prevent policy being adopted and increased the scope for policy misfit down the line,
resulting in the UK facing a series of court cases for the non-implementation of EU laws.7
However, by the 1990s the DoE began to ‘think European’ and started to engage more
positively with Brussels, seeking to upload key policy ideas such as environmental policy
integration, integrated pollution control and eco-auditing.8 The UK was transformed from
being a taker of EU policy to proactively trying to shape policy in order to minimise the
costs of compliance,9 to the extent that in the 2000s the UK became a key voice on climate
change at the European level, providing a leadership role and acting as a counterweight
to more climate-sceptic states within the Council.10 
5 Thus, overall, the EU has had a profound ‘Europeanizing’ effect upon UK environmental
policy by forcing a change in the preferred voluntarist style towards a more regulated
and transparent approach, and encouraging the UK to engage actively and positively with
EU  decision-making  processes.11 However,  patterns  of  Europeanization  have  been
variegated: in water and air policy the changes were profound and required significant
investment,  whereas  in  land-use  planning  the  EU  had  a  more  limited  effect.12 This
variegation suggests that the impact of Brexit upon UK policy styles and practice will be
similarly differentiated. It is likely that where significant changes and investments have
been made in infrastructure (water, air quality, renewables) stability, at least in the short
to  medium  term,  is  more  likely.  But  where  completely  new  policies  are  required
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(agriculture and fisheries), or where Europeanization has been less profound, the scope
for change may be greater. 
 
The Impact of the EU on the Party Politics of the
Environment
6 Whilst the EU has shaped UK environmental policy in profound ways it initially exerted
little direct influence on the party politics of the environment. However, in recent years
the  coupling  of  enviro-sceptic  and  euro-sceptic  rhetoric  on  the  right  has  led  to  a
heightened politicisation of EU environmental politics and policy within the UK in ways
that are shaping post-Brexit debates on environmental governance.
7 Since the 1980s the two major parties have undergone a slow and limited politicisation of
the environment. While no party can afford to ignore the issue, the Conservative and
Labour parties have both pursued a strategy of preference-accommodation, characterised
by a  reactive  approach to  public  opinion,  but  largely  resisting competition over  the
environment.13 Developments in the EU have occasionally encroached on this process. For
example, in the 1980s the UK was derided as the ‘Dirty Man of Europe’ for its failure to
implement EU environmental  policy and this  epithet  enabled Labour and the Liberal
Democrats to score political points against the Conservative Government. Elections to the
European Parliament also raised the profile of the Green Party,  particularly after the
introduction of proportional representation enabled the election of Green MEPs in 1999. 
8 There  was,  however,  a  step-change  in  2006,  which  heralded  unprecedented  party
competition  over  climate  change  and  encouraged  the  major  parties  to  shift  their
positions.  This  ‘competitive  consensus’14 amongst  the  parties  enabled  the  Labour
Government,  with  cross-party  support,  to  transform  climate  and  energy  policy  by
introducing the landmark Climate Change Act 2008 (CCA), which established ambitious
long term emission reduction targets on a statutory basis, five-yearly carbon budgets and
an independent Climate Change Committee with a remit to advise the government on the
policies needed to achieve these targets.15 The CCA was followed by a tranche of policy
measures  on  renewable  energy,  feed-in  tariffs,  infrastructure  planning  and domestic
energy efficiency, supported by significant public investment. 
9 The opening of this ‘window of opportunity’ for policy change can be explained by several
developments,  notably  growing  public  concern  about  climate  change,  Friends  of  the
Earth’s ‘The Big Ask’ campaign calling for a CCA, David Cameron’s decision to make the
environment the centrepiece of his strategy to modernise the Conservative Party and the
success of the Stern Review in galvanising business support for action on climate change.
16 The  EU contributed  to  these  developments  by  acting  as  an  external  policy  driver
sustaining  the  political  momentum  behind  the  CCA.  In  particular,  the  March  2007
European Council agreement on new climate and energy targets for 2020 included the
challenging target that 15% of all UK energy should come from renewable sources, which
effectively  compelled  the  Government  to  adopt  a  significantly  more  interventionist
energy policy requiring new and increased subsidies, new industrial incentives and a new
planning regime.17
10 Thus, during this period of a competitive consensus EU membership played a positive role
in encouraging parties to strengthen their environmental credentials and to compete
with their rivals on environmental issues. However, as the effects of the economic crisis
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started to bite,  both the EU and its  environmental  policy became the focus of  fierce
criticism from right wing politicians and media; in particular, climate scepticism joined a
wider  Conservative  frame  encompassing  anti-EU,  anti-regulation  and  anti-tax  views.
While the consensus among party leaders in favour of progressive climate policy was just
about  sustained  during  the  2010-2015  Coalition  Government,  the  broader  consensus
began to disintegrate. Thus the decision to adopt the 4th carbon budget in 2011 became
the site of conflict between Chris Huhne, the Liberal Democrat Secretary of State for
Energy  and  Climate  Change,  and  Conservative  Chancellor  George  Osborne,  who  was
concerned that economic competitiveness might be harmed if the UK moved faster to
reduce  its  emissions  than  other  EU  members.  Eventually  Prime  Minister  Cameron
intervened to ensure the budget was approved (subject to a review in 2014), arguing it
was essential if the UK was to meet its EU target of a 34% reduction in GHG emissions.18
Meanwhile, among Conservative MPs there was growing – and often vitriolic - criticism of
specific  climate  policies,  such  as  the  growth  of  onshore  wind  and  the  green  levies
imposed on electricity bills.19
11 In this same period the Government launched a review of the UK’s implementation of EU
habitats and birds directives to address concerns that the UK was overly enthusiastic in
implementing them (so-called gold-plating) and that they were an expensive obstacle to
growth.20 The review found that  the directives  were fit  for  purpose but  there was a
growing  rhetoric  around  the  imposition  of  costly  EU regulations.21 The  Government
launched  a  red  tape  challenge  in  2011  to  eradicate  ‘burdensome’  regulations  and
expressed irritation that  much of  the so-called red tape that  it  wanted to get  rid of
emanated from the EU and could not therefore be cut.22 
12 Given the profound Europeanization of this policy sector and the growth of a negative
discourse  around EU ‘green tape’,  it  is  perhaps  surprising that  environmental  policy
enjoyed limited salience during the referendum campaign.  Cameron made one major
speech23,  but otherwise the issue had little traction. Subsequently, as the scale of the
Brexit task and the huge implications for Defra became clear, the environment became a
major focus of post-referendum work and lobbying, to which we turn in the following
section.
 
Brexit and UK Environmental Policy
13 In the immediate aftermath of the referendum a key fear articulated by green groups was
that Brexit would lead to weaker environmental standards. In particular, they pointed
out  that  the  process  of  leaving  the  EU  could  lead  to  i)  regulatory  gaps  in  UK
environmental policy; ii) governance gaps; iii) poor co-ordination and policy incoherence
across the UK; and iv) deliberate policy retrenchment (given the negative rhetoric around
EU environmental policies). In this section we explain the problems associated with each
issue,  how the Government has sought to address these challenges and evaluate how
successful its strategy has been or is likely to be (at the time of writing many issues
remain unresolved).
 
Regulatory Gaps and the EU Withdrawal Bill
14 One early concern was the status of environmental regulations post-Brexit. EU directives
are incorporated into UK law via domestic legislation and will therefore remain in place
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once the UK leaves the EU. However, EU regulations have been incorporated into UK law
via article 2 (2) of the European Communities Act (ECA) of 197224 and there was concern
that, as the ECA will be repealed when the UK leaves the EU, any regulations given legal
force in the UK under the provisions of article 2(2) would cease to apply. As many of those
regulations  have  been  adopted  to  update  directives  there  was  scope  for  numerous
regulatory  gaps  emerging  in  UK  law.  To  address  this  risk  the  Government  brought
forward an EU Withdrawal Bill (EUWB) that will convert all EU law into ‘retained EU law’
to prevent legal loopholes and regulatory gaps emerging on exit day.25 The Bill was highly
controversial due to the powers it awards government to change law without input from
parliaments in the UK (at Westminster, Holyrood, Cardiff Bay and Stormont) and for its
implications for the UK’s constitutional settlement (see below). 
15 Moreover, there was also concern that some important elements of EU environmental law
would  not  be  carried  over,  such  as  the  environmental  policy  principles  that  are
articulated in the EU Treaties. For example, Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union
commits the EU to the pursuit of a high level of environmental protection, and Article 191
(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) states that EU environmental policy
should  be  based  upon  the  prevention,  polluter  pays,  precautionary  and  proximity
principles. The Government launched a consultation to gather views on how to address
this gap in Spring 2018 with a bill anticipated in early 2019. In parallel, during the debates
on the EUWB, an amendment was adopted stipulating that the Government bring forward
a bill within six months containing environmental principles and listing those that should
be included.26 This amendment was adopted partly due to on-going scepticism about the
Government’s genuine commitment to the environmental policy principles. After several
close votes and some parliamentary ‘ping-pong’ between the House of Commons and the
House of Lords, the Government managed to get the EUWB adopted, putting in place the
first stepping stone to Brexit.27 Its adoption means that most of the potential regulatory
gaps,  including  the  principles  gap,  should  now  be  addressed,  although  there  is
widespread apprehension about the magnitude of the task of reviewing all EU law that
will be carried over into UK law. 
 
Governance Gaps 
16 Alongside the potential regulatory gaps there is the possibility that Brexit could create
significant  environmental  governance  gaps.  Currently,  there  is  EU  involvement
throughout  the  UK  policy  cycle:  developing  policy,  providing  expertise  and  data
gathering, monitoring, implementation and enforcement.28 The UK benefits from being
able to draw upon expertise from the European Commission and a range of agencies,
including the European Environment Agency and the European Chemicals Agency, and
from other EU states.29 These repositories of expertise and innovation are unlikely to be
readily available post-Brexit. 
17 The UK is also obliged to provide regular reports to the Commission on its ability to
deliver  against  targets,  which  are  then  made  publicly  available.  These  transparent
reporting practices mean that citizens, NGOs and other groups can hold governments to
account if they have failed to meet targets or deliver on policy goals. Finally, in the event
of on-going implementation and enforcement lapses states can be prosecuted under EU
law and may eventually find their case being referred to the Court of Justice of the EU
(CJEU).  The  UK is  taken to  the  CJEU relatively  rarely  compared to  other  states,  but
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environmental  issues  are  those  that  most  often  see  the  UK  facing  EU  legal  action.
Moreover, whilst the UK tends to win most cases, in the field of environmental policy it
has  lost  21  out  of  25  cases  since  2003, 30 which  suggests  the  CJEU has  provided  an
important route for securing environmental policy implementation in the UK. 
18 To address this issue the government consultation launched in May 201831 also covered
environmental governance and proposed the creation of a new environmental watchdog
to  replace  some of  the  functions  that  currently  reside  with  the  CJEU and European
Commission.  However,  these  proposals  have  been  widely  condemned  as  offering  an
inadequate substitute for the EU’s enforcement regime, as the watchdog’s role would be
largely advisory and there is  currently no scope for fining the Government as a last
resort.32 Yet the Environment Secretary’s scope (let alone his willingness) to respond to
such criticisms may be limited by the opposition of the Treasury,  which regards the
watchdog as a potential threat to economic competitiveness,33 and there is wider political
resistance  to  establishing  a  body  that  can  levy  fines  against  the  government.  Thus,
despite the Government’s promise to create a powerful watch-dog, the new body seems
unlikely to fill the environmental governance gaps created by Brexit.
 
Coordination, Coherence and Devolution
19 Brexit has also highlighted the asymmetrical nature of the UK’s devolution settlement.
The  UK  Government  devolved  substantial  powers  to  Scotland,  Wales  and  Northern
Ireland in 1998 and environment, agriculture and fisheries are all devolved policy areas.
As an EU member subject to Article 193 [TFEU], the so-called Environmental Guarantee
article, all the UK’s devolved administrations are tied to the same minimum EU standards
but individual administrations can pursue more advanced policies should they wish to do
so.  Indeed,  there has been upward divergence in some policy sectors in the UK.  For
example, Scotland and Wales have more ambitious climate policies than England,34 while
Wales  has  ambitious  waste  policies,  a  sustainable  development  agenda  and a  Future
Generations  Commissioner.  By  contrast,  environmental  policy  has  limited salience in
Northern Ireland, where many recent environmental gains have been due to pressure
from the EU and where there is a real possibility that Brexit could lead to lower standards
with concomitantly negative implications for the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, with no
government in Northern Ireland at the time of writing Stormont has no voice at the table
in  the  on-going  negotiations  about  the  future  of  UK  environmental  policy.  The
‘confidence and supply’ relationship between the DUP and the Conservatives does provide
an opportunity for Northern Irish input,  but it  is not unproblematic as this informal
relationship privileges just one of the two major Northern Irish parties, with little in the
way of formal scrutiny or accountability. 
20 The  absence  of  the  EU  framework  setting  common  minimum  standards  raises  the
prospect of a regulatory “race to the bottom” and policy incoherence across the UK. One
solution would involve the four nations agreeing a minimum floor for environmental
policy similar to that provided currently by the EU. But this option has become mired in
political controversy over who will  decide what those minimum standards should be,
with tensions stoked by the UK Government’s handling of the EUWB process. The EUWB
stipulates that policy-making currently exercised in Brussels in those areas of devolved
competence will not in the first instance be automatically transferred to the devolved
nations. Instead, the EUWB provides for the UK Government to review those powers and,
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where it deems it appropriate, to devolve them back to Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland.  The  Scottish  Parliament  and  Welsh  Assembly,  and  their  Westminster  MPs,
dubbed this manoeuvre a ‘power grab’ and sought to amend the relevant provisions of
the EUWB. While the Welsh Assembly eventually gave its consent to the Bill the Scottish
Parliament refused to do so, although constitutionally it was unable to prevent the UK
Parliament from adopting the EUWB. 
21 As this constitutional dispute has rumbled on, the UK Government has been working with
the devolved administrations via the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), the body used to
coordinate cross-national policies, to try to establish at which level competence should be
exercised for environmental, agriculture and fisheries policies. However, the JMC is not
well-regarded by the devolved administrations. It meets irregularly at the behest of the
UK Government, which typically sets the agenda with little scope for meaningful input
from the devolved nations. It is also an opaque institution, which raises questions about
transparency and the ability of  stakeholders to influence the design of future policy.
These weaknesses were highlighted in March 2018 when the UK Government published35
a list of 153 policy areas upon which cross-UK coordination maybe required: it suggested
that 49 of them would require no common frameworks, 82 would need non-legislative
frameworks and 24 (including agriculture, chemicals and pesticides) would require UK-
wide legislative frameworks. There was no input from stakeholders in drawing up the list,
which does not have the backing of the Scottish and Welsh Governments. Indeed, the
Scottish Government has complained that in those 24 areas Scotland may be restricted on
legislating for up to 7  years.36 Moreover,  the proposed new environmental  watchdog
would only cover England, which raises the prospect of further divergence in policy-
making implementation and enforcement regimes within the UK. 
 
Deliberate Policy Retrenchment
22 The final  area of  concern,  articulated both at  UK and EU levels,  is  the fear that  the
Government will either deliberately roll back environmental standards or simply fail to
prioritise  the  environment  so  that  policy  stagnates.  Michel  Barnier,37 the  EU’s  chief
negotiator, has made clear that the EU wishes to see an environmental non-regression
principle included in any future EU-UK trade deal to mitigate the risk that the UK will
weaken standards to secure a competitive advantage. A new advocacy group, Greener UK,
has brought together all the key environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs)
to  present  a  united front  and to  lobby government  on the  priorities  for  post-Brexit
environmental  governance.  Greener  UK  has  prioritised  trying  to  guarantee,  at  a
minimum, the same level of protection for the environment post-Brexit in response to
widespread apprehension that the Government will weaken standards. It is worth noting
here that because the EU is a hyper-consensual polity – to become law, proposals require
agreement from the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the
European Parliament – it is difficult to secure agreement and even harder to roll back
policy once it  has  been adopted.38 Whilst  this  system has its  disadvantages  (i.e.  sub-
optimal  policies  can  be  difficult  to  change)  from an  environmental  perspective  one
advantage is that EU policy typically has longer time horizons and is more stable than
much domestic  policy.  After  departing  the  EU it  will,  in  principle,  be  easier  for  UK
environmental policies to be amended, so ENGOs are concerned that policies may become
subjected to change. For areas like renewable energy and climate change the prospect of
such  uncertainty  may  have  a  chilling  effect  upon  future  investment,39 and  there  is
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widespread apprehension about the implications of Brexit for key policy sectors such as
the  chemicals  industry,  where  participation  in  the  Single  Market  requires  the
implementation of EU rules.40 
23 The Government has been keen to assuage such fears, Prime Minister May declared that
in “areas like workers’ rights or the environment, the EU should be confident that we will not
engage in a race to the bottom in the standards and protections we set. There is no serious political
constituency  in  the  UK which  would  support  this  –  quite  the  opposite”.41 To  shore  up the
Government’s  environmental  credentials  May  made  the  astute  move  of  appointing
Michael  Gove as  her  Environment Secretary.  Gove,  a  leading Brexiteer,  is  a  dynamic
politician who has brought much-needed energy and drive to the role. Gove has been
keen  to  stress  that  the  UK  can  secure  a  “Green  Brexit”  with  no  weakening  of
environmental or animal welfare standards.42 In January 2018 Defra published its 25 Year
Environment Plan spelling out the Government’s priorities in the immediate and longer
term43 and during a farming consultation in Spring 2018 the Government committed to
greening  post-Brexit  agriculture  policy  and to  delivering  a  ‘public  money  for  public
goods’ approach in which public goods are broadly conceived to be environmental.44 In
addition,  as  noted  above,  the  Government  launched a  principles  and  governance
consultation45 and the EUWB was amended to secure the drafting of an environmental
principles bill in the near future. 
24 Yet,  set  against  these  positive  developments  are  various  statements  made  by  key
Government ministers. For example, during the referendum campaign George Eustice,
the  current  farming  minister,  described  the  habitats  and  birds  directives  as  ‘spirit
crushing’  and  said  they  would  ‘go’  post–Brexit.46 Boris  Johnson,  Foreign  Secretary,
implied in February 2018 that Brexit provided the opportunity to weaken planning rules
and legislation protecting  nature.47 Gove  himself  argued in  March 2017,  prior  to  his
appointment as Environment Secretary, that the habitats and birds directives should be
reformed or rescinded post Brexit.48 One of May’s first moves as Prime Minister was to
disband the Department for Energy and Climate Change, merging the energy and climate
portfolios  into  a  new Department  for  Business,  Energy and Industrial  Strategy.  Such
sentiments  have  fuelled  on-going  scepticism  about  the  Government’s  willingness  to
deliver its promised Green Brexit. Moreover, even if there is a willingness to secure a
‘Green Brexit’ there are on-going capacity challenges because Defra has been profoundly
weakened by austerity-inspired staffing cuts.49 While Defra is now rapidly recruiting staff
to deal with the Brexit workload it is still relatively understaffed given the challenges
involved,50 raising the risk of what the Environmental Audit Committee has called policy
“zombification”.51 This term refers to the prospect of policies being copied onto the UK
statute  book via  the  EUWB but  through lack  of  time or  staff,  not  being updated or
properly  implemented,  so  policies  would  technically  be  alive  in  a  legal  sense,  but
effectively dead – or zombie-like - in day-to-day practice.52 
25 An increased politicisation of environmental issues could offset this risk. Although the
environment  had  low  salience  during  the  referendum  and  election  campaigns,  age
emerged as key cleavage underpinning both results. Young people were much more likely
to support staying in the EU53 and in the 2017 general election younger voters (below 45)
were more likely to vote Labour – resulting in its much improved performance - while
older  voters  (over  60)  were  more  likely  to  vote  Conservative.54 Media  commentary
suggested that the publication of the Government’s 25 Year Environment Plan (YEP) had
in part been prompted by the Conservative Party trying to attract younger voters who
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had  voted  Labour  in  the  general  election.55 Indeed,  there  have  been  several  green
initiatives that appear to be part of a deliberate strategy to woo back younger voters,
including May’s decision to back down on the Conservative manifesto promise to hold a
parliamentary vote on lifting the ban on fox hunting and Gove’s measures to ban the sale
of ivory products, plant 50 million trees and introduce a plastic bottle deposit scheme.56 It
remains to be seen how committed the Conservatives are to this strategy; certainly the
publication of the YEP prompted a former advisor to May to argue that the environment
was not natural territory for the Conservative Party and that it should be investing its
energies elsewhere.57 
26 The Labour Party has been prepared to use the environment as part of its critique of
Government policy on Brexit,58 but it remains divided on Brexit more generally and has
made no concerted effort to take ownership of the environmental issue. However, Sadiq
Khan, the Labour Mayor of London has sought to make political capital over the on-going
air quality issue.59 The UK Government has been successfully prosecuted and referred to
the CJEU for failing to implement the EU’s ambient air quality laws, with London blighted
by particularly poor air quality. Any attempt by the Government to weaken air quality
standards post-Brexit would provide a golden opportunity for Khan to embarrass the
Government.  However,  it  seems  like  much  of  the  heavy  lifting  involved  in  keeping
environmental policy in the public eye and high up the policy agenda will be done by
ENGOs,  who will  face a post-Brexit  resource challenge as many have benefitted from
pooled capacity at the EU level and from funding from the European Commission. 
 
Conclusion
27 Brexit raises the prospect of a fundamental destabilisation of the UK’s environmental
policy  sector.  After  an  initial  struggle  with  the  EU’s  way  of  doing  business  the  UK
acclimatised itself to the EU and became an active participant in decision making and a
leader  on  climate  change.  However,  as  the  economic  crisis  took  hold  and  the  UK
Government embraced an austerity agenda, EU environmental policy became the focus of
negative  political  rhetoric  from  the  political  right.  Consequently,  the  Conservative
Government’s claims that it wants a ‘Green Brexit’ have been treated with a degree of
scepticism. Certainly there has been considerable activity in the environmental policy
sector where the energetic Environment Secretary, Michael Gove, has tried to make a
success  of  his  brief,  bringing  forward  several  major  policy  pronouncements  and
consultations in the first half of 2018 with the intention of establishing the planks for a
‘Green Brexit’.  However,  the  negative  statements  of  key  cabinet  members  (including
Gove),  the major capacity challenges facing Defra and the destabilisation of  the UK’s
constitutional settlement with environmental policy at the centre of an on-going dispute
between the UK and Scottish Governments, all suggest that the environment is in for a
rocky  ride.  The  EU’s  preference  for  a  non-regression  principle,  business  pressure  to
maintain a stable policy regime and the on-going advocacy of Greener UK may help to
counter these negative pressures. However, the overall impact of the UK’s departure from
an organisation that has made environmental leadership part of its identity is very likely
to involve some dampening of British policy ambition. Conversely, the loss of the UK’s
role as a climate leader from the Council is a significant negative consequence of Brexit
for the EU. 
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28 Charlotte Burns is Professor of Sustainable Growth at the University of Sheffield
and is a co-chair of the Brexit and Environment network. Neil Carter is Professor of
Politics  at  the  University  of  York.  He  has  published  widely  on  environmental
politics and policy. The 3rd edition of his book The Politics of the Environment: Ideas,
Activism, Policy (Cambridge University Press), was published in July 2018.
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ABSTRACTS
In 2016 the United Kingdom (UK) voted in a referendum to leave the European Union (EU). Whilst
the environment did not feature significantly in the referendum campaign it has emerged as a
major focus for the UK Government as it prepares for Brexit. Since the UK joined the EU in 1973,
its  approach  to  environmental  policy-making  has  been  profoundly  shaped  by  processes  of
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of a ‘Green Brexit’ there are on-going concerns that Brexit will lead to weaker environmental
ambition  and  governance.  It  may  also  produce  policy  divergence  across  the  UK  as  the
environmental  sector  is  devolved  and  has  become  a  site  of  constitutional  conflict  over  the
powers of the devolved nations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. A once stable policy
area characterised by a broad cross-party and cross-national consensus therefore is, post-Brexit,
increasingly  likely  to  become  a  focus  for  constitutional  and  party  political  conflict  and
competition. 
En  2016,  le  Royaume  Uni  a  choisi  par  référendum  de  quitter  l’Union  Européenne.  Bien  que
l’environnement ait été un sujet mineur lors de la campagne, cette question est depuis apparue
comme une dimension très importante de la sortie de l’UE. Depuis que le Royaume-Uni a rejoint
l’Union Européenne en 1973, son mode de gestion politique des questions environnementales a
été profondément influencé par les processus d’européanisation. L’intégration et l’adaptation de
l’acquis communautaire dans ce domaine représentent par conséquent une tâche extrêmement
complexe. Si le gouvernement britannique s’est engagé à mettre en place un « Brexit vert », de
nombreux  acteurs  s’inquiètent  d’un  affaiblissement  de  la  gouvernance  et  des  ambitions
environnementales britanniques. Le Brexit pourrait également mener à une fragmentation des
politiques environnementales à travers le Royaume-Uni, car il s’agit là d’un point important du
débat constitutionnel relatif aux pouvoirs respectifs de l’Ecosse, du pays de Galles et de l’Irlande
du Nord.  Alors  que  l’environnement constituait  un  domaine  politique  relativement  stable  et
consensuel,  cette  question  est  donc  amenée  à  devenir,  après  le  Brexit,  beaucoup  plus
conflictuelle et caractérisée par une intensification des antagonismes entre les différents partis
et nations dus Royaume-Uni.
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